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Abstract 
As part of its growing imperial aspirations that were part of the so-called Mare 
Nostrum attempt, the Italian Empire sought to build up nationalist propaganda on 
Cyprus. The irredentist activities and propaganda coordinated by the Italian 
Embassy in Cyprus alarmed the British governors and the Foreign Office. By 
drawing upon archival documents, I analyse the evolution of the strategic 
importance of Cyprus for the British Empire, which had begun to evolve in 
response to the perceived threat posed by the Italian Empire during the interwar 
period. The main argument put forward here is that under these new 
circumstances Cyprus became a significant geostrategic possession for the British 
Empire. The Italian Empire, having colonised the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean 
Sea, was gradually making its presence felt in Cyprus in the 1920s and went on to 
do so more vigorously in the 1930s. The Italian ambassador was perceived as 
persona non grata by the British government in Cyprus. It was therefore difficult 
for the British Empire under the actual or at least the perceived threat of Italian 
influence to permit Cypriots to exercise their right of self-determination.   
Keywords: Cyprus, Italian Empire, interwar period, British Empire, Mediterranean. 
 
 
 
Scholars who stress the geostrategic importance of Cyprus often consider her to be 
the ‘unsinkable aircraft’ of the Mediterranean (O’Malley & Craig 2001). George Hill 
demonstrated that throughout the centuries the empires that had controlled 
Cyprus were the rulers of the Eastern Mediterranean to emphasise the geopolitical 
attraction of the island to foreign rulers (Hill 1952). However, Cyprus’s geostrategic 
importance has not been static but has evolved over times at a speed that has 
depended on the developments in the wider geopolitical context of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. By drawing upon the perceived threat that Italian ambitions in 
Cyprus were posing, I seek to shed light on the gradual change in the geostrategic 
importance of Cyprus that had a direct impact on the colonial rule and the 
administrative policies that were in force on the island. The new reality of world 
order in the aftermath of the First World War had serious repercussions for the 
strategic importance of Cyprus in the vital Eastern Mediterranean area for the 
declining British Empire. The Eastern Mediterranean had definitely been a vital 
zone for British imperial interests since its emergence as a global power.1  The 
Mediterranean was not only a route used by the British but a region of critical 
importance for the Empire (Holland 2012). As Pratt demonstrates, Mediterranean 
played a role of a paramount importance in British global strategy in the late 1930s 
(Pratt 1975). 
 One aspect that is often omitted by scholars studying the history of British 
Cyprus is the extent to which the Italian imperial ambitions for the island and the 
policies that were applied to it had impacted the British policies in force on the 
island. I argue in this article that the evolution of British policies applied to the 
island also has to be better understood in the context of the Anglo–Italian imperial 
rivalry in the Mediterranean during the interwar period. By examining the British 
fears of Italian expansionism under Mussolini, it is argued that the future of 
Cyprus was never going to be determined only by Britain and the local population. 
According to a Foreign Office memorandum, at the beginning of the First World 
War, it was understood that the future of Cyprus would have to be reconsidered 
when peace was made and be related to the whole Eastern settlement.2 The great 
powers of the period, Britain, France and Italy, were constantly concerned with the 
status of Cyprus. 
 In the late 1930s, as the potential for a Second World War seemed more 
likely, the British Foreign Office was planning the establishment of more military 
bases in key geostrategic areas. Many reports and plans were prepared by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence that aimed to establish Cyprus as a defence base in 
the Eastern Mediterranean in the late 1930s.3 However, the Colonial Office was 
monitoring the evolving situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East before 
making a definite decision regarding the British defence policy vis-à-vis Italy.4 
 
 
Mare Nostrum 
 
One of the most important elements in the British strategic considerations relating 
to the Eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period was the growing Italian 
imperial ambitions. In this article I explore how the British perceived Italian 
ambitions in the Mediterranean. In particular, I draw upon the archival material 
found in the British National Archives in order to demonstrate that the British were 
seriously concerned about the Italian Empire’s aspirations for Cyprus. Reports on 
the Italian consul in Cyprus and official correspondence in the Foreign Office show 
British fears about the Italian influence in the British colony. 
 The advent of Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy was soon translated into the 
revisionist aspirations of the Italian Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean (Cassels 
1999). The guiding principle of Italian foreign policy in the interwar period was the 
Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) quest through which domination over the areas that had 
formerly been ruled by the Roman Empire was regarded as the foremost aim of 
fascist Italy. It was thought that this was needed to achieve national regeneration 
after the ‘mutilated’ victory in the Great War. By 1937, Mare Nostrum constituted 
Italy’s official policy (Mallett 2003, p.107). As Salerno illustrates, these grand 
imperial ambitions of Mussolini to control the Mediterranean sea was posing a 
major concern to the British global interests (Salerno 2002).  
 Mussolini’s geopolitical vision was articulated in his 1939 remarks to the 
Grand Council. For Mussolini, Italy was “a prisoner of the Mediterranean, and the 
more populous and prosperous Italy becomes, the more its imprisonment will gall”. 
For Mussolini the “bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunis, Malta, Cyprus” (Knox 
1982, p.40). The first step that Italian policy should follow was to “break the bars of 
the prison”. For Mussolini, the plan to make the Mediterranean a mare italiano was 
of paramount importance to annihilate the British and French influence in this sea. 
He considered the presence of Britain and France as parasitical (Simms 2014, 
p.328). Mussolini believed that Britain was an “‘avaricious’ and essentially 
‘bourgeois’ nation’’ that was only pursuing the maintenance of the “existing 
geopolitical status quo, thereby keeping Italy ‘imprisoned’ within its own sea” 
(Mallett 2003, p.35). 
 In the light of this imperial goal, Italy posed a serious threat to the British 
Empire which controlled the Eastern Mediterranean at the time. With the advent of 
the First World War, Italy’s ambitions for the expansion of her dominions in the 
Levant seemed very threatening to the British Empire. In 1914, Italy, as did France, 
showed that she was not indifferent to Cyprus’s fate. According to a British 
memorandum, Italy would have preferred Cyprus to remain under British 
sovereignty because she did not want Greece to have it.5 Italy perceived that any 
cession of Cyprus to Greece would have significantly strengthened Greece’s claims 
to Rhodes.6  
 
 Italian Consulate in Cyprus 
 
The British government in Cyprus started to be concerned about Italy’s 
Mediterranean ambitions from the late 1920s (Fiore 2013). However, it was only 
during the mid-1930s and especially after the 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia 
that the British government in Cyprus consistently monitored the activities of the 
Italian consul in Nicosia. Despite the fact that there were numerous reports 
describing an “increased dislike of the Italians”7 among Cypriots after their invasion 
of Abyssinia, the Foreign Office was still continuously fearful of Italian expansion in 
Cyprus. Sometimes it seemed as if it was more worried about Italy’s activities than 
those of the Greek and Turkish consuls who were usually the focus of British 
attention.   
 Even in the late 1920s, when the petitions from the Greek Cypriot delegates 
calling for the Union with Greece were increasingly annoying, the British held that 
even the Greek Cypriots knew that it was very likely that if the British left the 
island the Italians or the Turks would eventually incorporate Cyprus into their 
respective territory. In particular, Mr Dawe, an official from the Colonial Office, 
wrote in 1929 that “Greek Cypriots are afraid that if they were handed over without 
some such arrangement, the Island sooner or later would be snapped up, either by 
Italy or Turkey”.8 Mr Dawe was confident that “Greek Cypriots would far rather be 
under the British than under the Italians or the Turks”.9 This confidence was based 
upon the increasingly deteriorating Greek–Italian relations during this period.  
 Although the 1931 October Revolt had only just occurred, the British 
government in Cyprus were concerned about the ‘Italian threat’. In November 1931, 
in private and confidential correspondence, a Foreign Office official, Mr Bayle, wrote 
about the prospect of a Union of the island with Greece: “Then, of course, there is 
the other side of the question. If Cyprus were handed over to Greece how long 
would it remain Greek? Italy, France and Turkey would be fighting, like dogs over a 
bone, for her; and Rhodes is a good example of what the Italians can do to a 
Colony. No, when all is considered I think Cyprus is very well off indeed and the 
people ought to be thankful for what they have got.”10 Italy’s growing aspirations 
and influence were definitely and directly affecting British policy in Cyprus. 
 The British were concerned that because all the consulates were moved to 
Nicosia this could increase their influence in local politics. The Colonial Office 
worried about the transfer of the offices of the consuls of Greece, Turkey and Italy 
to Nicosia because “opportunities for intrigue and the spread of propaganda” were 
“far greater than in Larnaca”.11 In 1937, a report on the political situation in 
Cyprus regarding the first five months of the year stated that “the Turkish and 
Italian consuls have not openly been active during the period”.12 
 Giuseppe Brigidi arrived in Cyprus from Canada as the new Italian consul 
de carrière in 1936.13 British intelligence monitored his activities. A secret report in 
1936 strongly warned that his early activities were pointing to the fact that his 
“undercover intentions of his post” were to “spread Italian propaganda in 
Cyprus”.14 Giuseppe Brigidi kept the office of Italian consul for only one year as he 
left Cyprus on 9 November 1937 to transfer to the Italian consulate at Hankow, 
China.15 The significance that the Italians were giving to Cyprus had been 
illustrated by the appointment of this important consul.  
 Numerous intelligence reports gave a detailed account of the Italian consul’s 
activities in Cyprus. In 1936, Governor Richmond Palmer sent a secret report on 
the political situation in Cyprus to Ormsby-Gore, the secretary of state for the 
colonies.16 In the report Palmer referred to the ceremony of 4 November 1936 the 
Italian consulate had held in order to celebrate the birthday of the King of Italy, 
Vittorio Emanuele III. Palmer described it as a gathering that was exclusively for 
known fascists. The Italian consul, wearing his uniform, along with forty Italian 
fascists, attended the ceremony. Palmer’s report gives a detailed account, even 
describing the badges on the uniforms of the officials. The branch of the Italian 
Navy League that (in 1936) had just been established in Cyprus was wearing a 
badge that had the Mare Nostrum (Palmer translated it as ‘the sea belongs to us’) 
inscription.17 Palmer also reported that five Italian children had been sent from 
Cyprus during the past summer to attend a fascist camp in Italy. 
 The tense relations between the British government and the Italian consul 
were also demonstrated during the government’s celebration for the coronation of 
King George VI. On 12 May 1937, throughout the British colony of Cyprus a 
number of official ceremonies were held in honour of the British king all across the 
island. However, “all the Italian Consular authorities in the Island boycotted the 
Coronation ceremonies”.18  
 At the same time as making efforts to nurture anti-British feelings, the 
Italian consulate aimed to enhance a close connection with the powerful Greek 
Orthodox Church.19 Governor Palmer attempted to alert the Colonial Office of the 
good relationship that had been built up between the Italian consulate and the 
Greek Orthodox Church. In a secret report Palmer gave an account of “the prospect 
of an entente cordiale” between the Italian consul and the locum tenens.20 Palmer, 
in order to support his point, described one occasion on which the Italian consul 
called on the locum tenens, who returned the call immediately.21 The Greek consul 
also opposed the close relation between the Italian consul and the Greek Church. 
The Greek consul was reported to have said that “the Locum Tenens is 
endeavouring to play off the Italian consul against him in political and church 
matters”.22 However, this Greek–Italian rivalry was accurately described in a British 
intelligence report, which said that there was “no love lost between these two 
Consuls”.  
 The Italian consulate was also gradually building good relations with the 
minority Maronite community of the island. In 1936, the especially dedicated 
thanks-giving service in Larnaca that was held to celebrate Italy’s successful 
invasion of Abyssinia was also attended by members of the Maronite community.23 
The presence of the Maronites, who are affiliated with the Catholic Church, was 
embraced by the Italian consulate, and after the service they were “shown over an 
Italian merchant vessel which was in harbor”.24 The British government was deeply 
concerned by this affinity and ordered an investigation into the motives of their 
attendance. During the investigation the government discovered that a Cypriot 
Italian who lived near the Maronite village of Kormakitis was “indulging in some 
Italian propaganda on his own behalf”.25 Yet the intelligence service reported to the 
British government that “he has been severely warned and it is unlikely that he will 
indulge in propaganda in future”.26  
 
 
Press Control and Propaganda  
 
In the aftermath of the October Revolt of 1931, an authoritarian regime was 
imposed in Cyprus (Georgallides 1985; Rappas 2014). A series of laws that was 
passed during the 1930s abolished any notion of the freedom of the press and 
granted to the British colonial government strong control over the censorship of the 
press and films. Despite this extensive control of the information network, the 
British government was deeply concerned with the Italian propaganda efforts in 
Cyprus and the British government in Cyprus insisted that the Reuters news 
agency should be the sole information source for the local press in relation to 
international affairs. The British government was agitated when an intelligence 
report outlined that the Italian consul had arranged “to have transmitted free of 
charge all world news received by him through Stephani Agency”, the official fascist 
news agency, “provided that newspapers which took this news should cease to 
publish Reuter’s”. 27 The report also revealed that this move from the Italian consul 
had appealed to at least one local newspaper, whose editor was publishing “almost 
daily articles which have already appeared in the Italian Press”.28 In 1936, it was 
also reported that the Italian consul himself was, “under cover of his post”, actively 
spreading fascist propaganda in Cyprus.29 
 The fascist radio station Radio Bari, which had been broadcasting since its 
establishment in 1934, had acted as a propaganda medium and was systematically 
spreading fascist propaganda throughout the Mediterranean (Williams 2006, p.82). 
In 1937, the Foreign Office considered establishing a wave transmitter on Cyprus 
that would be controlled by the Foreign Office in order to effectively combat Italian 
propaganda throughout the Arab world (MacDonald 1977, p.202). Radio Bari’s 
activities and its efforts to spread Italian propaganda and stimulate anti-British 
sentiments also included several publications in local languages, especially Arabic, 
that were distributed in Arab-speaking countries in the region. In Cyprus it had 
also published and distributed books in Greek. In 1937, the Italian Broadcasting 
Company at Bari published a book featuring the history and activities of Radio Bari 
during the first three years of its existence. The book, which was “printed in Greek 
and Italian”, emphasised “the friendly relations between Greece and Italy”. 30 The 
Italian consul himself distributed “several copies of this book” in Cyprus.31  
 The overlooked project of establishing a British university in Cyprus in the 
1930s also highlights the British fears of Italian expansionism under Mussolini.32 
British possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean were at stake in the aftermath of 
the First World War. Since the early 1930s the Foreign Office had been eagerly 
planning the establishment of a university in the region in order to ‘shape the local 
elites to be favorably familiar with the culture and values of the West’.33 Cyprus 
was considered the most likely location for the establishment of this institution. 
Although the project was eventually not realized due to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, its significance lies in the demonstration of the British grand strategy 
in the Eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period. Reports prepared by the 
Foreign Office disclose two of the main aims of the project.34 The first was to control 
the spread of nationalist ideas and make the local elites familiar with British 
values. The second objective was to combat the Italian propaganda.35 Johnstone 
characterised the Italian cultural propaganda as a menace as it was “seriously 
injuring, or threatening to injure, British political interests in the Mediterranean”. 36 
 
 
After the Abyssinian Invasion  
 
The Italian activities on Cyprus and in the Middle East were also closely followed by 
all the British consulates and embassies across the region of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Throughout the 1930s, between the Foreign Office and the British 
Embassy in Ankara there was voluminous correspondence regarding the Italian 
government’s Eastern Mediterranean policy.37 After the 1936 Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia, a change in the Italian policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was noticed 
by the British officials in the Foreign Office (Barros 1982).38  
 The 1930s Anglo–Italian rapprochement was perceived with a certain 
amount of scepticism by the Foreign Office. The British officials considered that 
Italy ostensibly desired close and friendly relations with Britain but that she was 
deliberately waiting before attempting to fulfil her imperial ambitions. Sir Percy 
Loraine argued that the 1936 Anglo–Italian agreement was a product of the Italian 
volte-face after the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Loraine held that it would be a 
“natural and reasonable calculation that Italy can more easily and more effectively 
spread her influence and her power in the Eastern Mediterranean in the sun of 
Anglo-Italian friendship rather than in the icy shade of Anglo-Italian tension”.39 The 
British ambassador continued to argue that Italy was merely attempting to “guard 
and reinforce by diplomatic methods her eastern naval flank”.40 
 In 1938, Governor Palmer was invited to attend a party as the representative 
of the government of Cyprus at the Italian consulate in Nicosia for the birthday of 
the King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III. However, Richmond Palmer, in an interview 
with the Italian consul, explained that it was an established practice in Cyprus that 
the government’s representative at consular functions should be the commissioner 
of the district. The Italian consul used this occasion to speak about the status of 
consuls in Cyprus.41 The Foreign Office was very upset by the behaviour of the 
Governor Palmer. On 9 March 1939, an official from the Foreign Office commented 
on the occasion and said that he could not understand “why the Colonial Secretary 
should be too grand to go to this party. The Governor might consider it beneath his 
dignity but is the person of the Colonial Secretary so sacred?”42 The Foreign Office 
official held that “the attitude of the Cyprus authorities towards foreign consuls is 
stupid and is doing us a certain amount of harm, but it is no use trying to get any 
sense into the head of Sir Richmond Palmer, who is fortunately leaving Cyprus on 
the 22nd April. His successor may have more tact”.43 
 As the Second World War approached, the British Empire was even more 
alert to the Italian advances in the Mediterranean. The British Empire was 
concerned that the Italians were using Cyprus in order to supply their army in 
North Africa.44 For instance, on 14 October 1937 the Criminal Investigation 
Department in Nicosia sent the colonial secretary a secret intelligence report 
detailing that the Mantovani shipping agency from Larnaca was “approached by an 
Italian firm in Port Said and asked to quote prices for a large supply of mules. It is 
thought that these mules are required for the Italian Army in North Africa.” 45 At 
the same time, the British government in Cyprus became agitated about 
information regarding an alleged plan to establish air facilities for Italy in Cyprus. 
In particular, it had been reported that the Italian Air Transport Company that 
operated an air service “between Italy-Greece-Rhodes and Haifa” requested “the 
Socony Vacuum Oil Company in Cyprus to establish a petrol depot at Polis (near 
Cape Akamas)”.46   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
An examination of Italian imperial policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is of 
paramount importance in order to understand British imperial policy in Cyprus 
and the Eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period. I have highlighted the 
strategic considerations of the British Empire and examined the evolution of the 
British policy underlying the continuities and the changes throughout the period in 
question. 
 I argue that the evolution of the strategic importance of the island for the 
British Empire should be examined in the context of the power politics of the period 
and the events that were taking place at the same time in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region. Though Cyprus is an island, the events there were not 
marginalised or isolated from developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 
insular territory of Cyprus was influenced by the events that were taking place in 
the region. The evolving geostrategic significance of Cyprus for the British Empire 
had a direct impact on the policies of the British administration. Cyprus was, 
relatively, the safest and most stable place among the British-influenced areas of 
the Levant.  
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